

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-08

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 PM-03 NSCE-00 INR-05 CIAE-00  
NSAE-00 DODE-00 EA-06 NEA-07 IO-06 OMB-01 TRSE-00  
ACDA-08 /059 W  
-----049824 210017Z /41

R 181340Z MAY 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1995  
INFO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KABUL  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
USLO PEKING  
CINCEUR VAIHINGEN  
CINCPAC  
USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 3828

LIMDIS

NAPLES ALSO FOR INTAF

DEPT ALSO FOR NEA/RA

CINCEUR AND CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PEPR, AF, PK, TU, IR, SA, CENTO  
SUBJ: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY OF COUP IN AFGHANISTAN

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REF: (A) TEHRAN 4547 (DTG 140706Z MAY 78), (B) KABUL 4018  
(DTG 170956Z MAY 78)

1. I SHARE AMBASSADORS SULLIVAN AND ELIOT'S ASSESSMENTS OF  
THE INCREASINGLY CORROSIVE IMPACT THAT A COMMUNIST AFGHANISTAN  
WILL HAVE ON THE CENTRAL REGION AND HOW THAT IMPACT MAY  
AFFECT THE PERCEPTION OF THE VALUE OF THE US TO THE

REGION. FOR TURKEY, THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ANY PERCEIVED US INDIFFERENCE TO THAT SITUATION IS DWARFED BY TURKEY'S OWN ANXIETY OVER THE FUTURE OF ITS BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US. NEVERTHELESS, PRIME MINISTER ECEVIR RECENTLY CALLED FOR AN UPDATING OF CENTO'S MANDATE AND OPERATIONS "TO CONFORM TO PRESENT NEEDS" (ANKARA 3737, NOTAL).

2. I AGREE WITH MY COLLEAGUES (REFTELS) THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO BOLSTER THE POLITICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MILITARY POSITIONS OF THE NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. I WOULD LIKE TO SUGGEST, HOWEVER, THAT NO NEW MECHANISM IS NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK. FOR YEARS THE US HAS CONTINUED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ACTIVITIES OF A SEMI-MORIBUND CENTO. WE HAVE JUSTIFIED THIS PARTICIPATION BY NOTING ITS MODEST FINANCIAL COST TO US. FURTHER, WE HAVE SAID TO OURSELVES THAT CENTO IS A GOOD STANDY ALLIANCE WHICH WE COULD ENERGIZE IN THE FUTURE IF WE DO DISIRED. THESE ARGUMENTS HAVE ALWAYS STRUCK ME AS RATIONALIZATIONS FOR OUR FAILURE TO SEEK ON THE ONE HAND, A USEFUL ROLE FOR CENTO OR, ON THE OTHER HAND, TO MAKE A DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM WHAT IS PERCEIVED BY SOME AS A USELESS ORGANIZATION.

3. CENTO DOES HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR A NEW US POLICY INITIATIVE IN THE CENTRAL REGION. THESE INCLUDE:

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--IT IS AN EXISTING ANTI-COMMUNIST ALLIANCE WHOSE REGIONAL MEMBERS ARE THE COUNTRIES POTENTIALLY THE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.

--MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE CAN BE CHANNELED THROUGH AN ALREADY ESTABLISHED AND UNDER-UTILIZED CENTO SECRETARIAT.

--WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN, THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF THE GLENN AMENDMENT COULD BE MINIMIZED THROUGH ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN THAT INCLUDED AT LEAST ONE OTHER CENTO BENEFICIARY.

--EFFORTS TO REASSURE CENTO REGIONAL COUNTRIES OF RENEWED US INTEREST IN THEIR WELFARE WOULD NOT BE READILY IDENTIFIABLE AS BEING ANTI-AFGHANISTAN BUT RATHER A DEMONSTRATION OF A BROADER US EFFORT TO REJUVENATE OUR TREATY COMMITMENTS.

--US EXPRESSIONS OF INTEREST IN CENTO SHOULD EVOKE A SIMILAR RESPONSE FROM THE REGIONAL MEMBERSHIP INCLUDING ADDITIONAL IRANIAN FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE.

4. AS A FIRST STEP IN EXPLORING CENTO AS A MECHANISM TO COUNTER THE INCREASINGLY PESSIMISTIC MOOD IN PAKISTAN, (A MOOD THAT MAY WELL SPREAD TO THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE REGION) WE MIGHT OFFER TO RESTUDY THE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM FOR WHICH FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER TENTATIVELY PLEDGED A FIVE MILLION DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION. IN ADDITION, WE COULD UNILATERALLY INCREASE THE US ECONOMIC AID BLOCK GRANT TO CENTO WHICH HAS REMAINED AT THE \$500,000 LEVEL FOR MANY YEARS. FINALLY, WE COULD ACTIVELY CONSULT WITH THE UK TO SEEK A FORMULA BY WHICH THE LONG STALEMATED POLITICAL GUIDANCE PAPER FOR CENTO MILITARY PLANNING COULD BE EXPEDITIOUSLY CONCLUDED.

5. CENTO SECRETARY GENERAL GURUN WILL MEET WITH THE SECRETARY IN  
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WASHINGTON ON JUNE 27. GURUN STRIKES ME AS A MAN WHO WOULD LIKE TO MAKE MEANINGFUL CENTO'S CONTRIBUTION TO SECURITY IN THE REGION. WE MIGHT USE THIS OCCASION PUBLICLY TO EXPRESS OUR COMMITMENT TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STABILITY. AS A SYMBOL OF THAT RENEWED COMMITMENT, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT CHOOSE TO MEET BRIEFLY WITH GURUN DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT.

6. I RECOGNIZE THAT THESE ARE MODEST STEPS BUT FOR THAT VERY REASON I BELIEVE THEM TO BE PRACTICAL. THERE DOES REMAIN IN MY MIND A QUESTION OF WHETHER CENTO COULD RISE EVEN TO THIS MODEST CHALLENGE AND I WOULD WANT TO START THE REJUVENATION PROCESS SLOWLY SO THE OLD MAN DOESN'T GET OVER STIMULATED.  
SPIERS

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## Message Attributes

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